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Modern futures trading—the organized trading of 
contracts to buy and sell things at a later date—began at 
the Chicago Board of Trade in the 1860s. Since then, 
the number of futures markets has grown exponentially. 
These markets strongly influence the prices and quanti-
ties of a vast array of foods, grains, livestock, metals, 
industrial materials, and financial assets. Almost since 
they began, futures markets have excited debate about 
whether they make prices more volatile. Organizations 
representing producers, especially farmers, have argued 
that they do. This public debate has generated a sizable 
academic literature. 
The academic literature has studied futures markets 
from both empirical and theoretical perspectives. The 
empirical studies have compared how prices behave 
before and after the introduction of futures markets. 
(For a summary of the empirical research, see the 
references cited in Turnovsky 1983.) Although the 
empirical results are mixed, they seem to show that the 
volatility of prices tends to decrease when futures 
markets are introduced into an economy. The theoreti-
cal literature largely stems from Friedman's (1953) 
argument that speculation necessarily reduces the 
volatility of prices. The theoretical work suggests that 
under plausible assumptions about the sources of 
economic disturbances, futures markets reduce the 
volatility of prices. (See, for example, Turnovsky 1983 
and Turnovsky and Campbell 1985.) It is difficult, 
however, to know how generally this result applies, 
since the literature uses very specific functional forms 
to model the objectives of market participants. 
In this paper, we clarify the set of circumstances 
under which futures markets stabilize, or reduce the 
volatility of, prices. We show that, under a fairly strin-
gent set of assumptions, the introduction of futures mar-
kets does stabilize prices. The assumptions we make 
are stringent, for we can easily construct examples in 
which they do not hold and in which prices become 
more volatile when futures markets are introduced. 
We go beyond this issue, however. We also point out 
and question an implicit assumption in both the popular 
debate and the academic literature on the effect of 
futures markets—the assumption that lower price vola-
tility is socially desirable. We show here that no direct 
or obvious link exists between price volatility and social 
welfare. 
This perhaps more important finding suggests that 
price stability, in and of itself, should not be regarded as 
a policy goal. It clearly is a goal of U.S. policymakers 
now. For example, in the wake of the October 1987 
stock market crash, a variety of regulations were pro-
posed to limit the variability of stock prices. To the 
*The models and most of the results presented in this paper were developed 
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extent that policy proposals are based on the belief that 
lower price volatility is desirable, they start from the 
wrong premise. To ensure that any such proposed 
changes are beneficial, policymakers must examine 
their effects not on price stability, but rather on 
economic welfare. 
A Model of Futures Markets 
We now set about constructing a formal model of an 
economy with futures markets. So that the model can 
address the effect of futures markets on price stability 
and welfare, we must first take a stand on what they do. 
That is, exactly what role do these markets perform? 
Defining Their Role 
Again, futures markets are organized exchanges in 
which participants trade contracts to deliver or accept 
quantities of a specified commodity or asset at a 
specified later date at a currently agreed on price. (See 
Siegel and Siegel 1990 for an excellent, detailed discus-
sion of futures markets; also see Hieronymus 1971, 
Gold 1975, and Carlton 1984 for detailed descriptions 
of the history and operations of these markets.) Since 
the price for future delivery is agreed on now, producers 
and owners of the commodity or asset, like farmers and 
grain elevator operators, clearly can use futures mar-
kets to protect themselves against the risk that prices 
will fall between today and the delivery date. Similarly, 
consumers, like grain mills and food companies, can 
protect themselves against the risk that prices will rise. 
By protecting themselves in this way, of course, pro-
ducers and consumers forgo the profits they would 
make if, in the meantime, prices should move in the 
other direction. Still, by participating in futures markets, 
producers and consumers transfer the price risk to other 
market participants, typically called speculators. These 
are people who are more willing to accept the risks 
involved. A primary role of futures markets, therefore, 
is to allocate risks more efficiently than markets with-
out futures trading. In this sense, futures markets 
perform an insurance role. 
Making Assumptions 
For our model economy, we make several natural 
simplifying assumptions. First, we assume that specula-
tors are risk neutral they care about only the average 
level of their profits, not how variable their profits are 
about this level. Second, we assume that producers are 
risk averse: they care about both the average level of 
profits and the variability about that level. Third, we 
assume that price variability occurs because consumer 
demand for the producers' good is variable. In the 
model, producers must decide how much of the good to 
produce before they know the demand for it. Once the 
good is produced, its demand is realized and its price is 
determined by the familiar requirement that supply 
equal demand. Fourth, for simplicity, we abstract away 
from inventory-holding decisions and assume that the 
good is not storable. 
Describing the Environment 
Our model has one industry. In it, a nonstorable good is 
produced each period. Production commitments must 
be made one period before output is realized. If a pro-
ducer decides at time t — 1 to produce qt units of the 
good during time t, a cost of ct = C(qt) is incurred in 
period t. 
The inverse demand function for the industry's good 
at time ns given by P(Qt, e„ 77,_{), where Qt is aggregate 
output at t and et and r)t- x are shocks to demand. Aggre-
gate output is the sum of the outputs of each producer. 
The demand shocks occur because of changes in the 
tastes or incomes of consumers. The shock e is a 
temporary change in tastes or incomes, whereas the 
shock 77 is relatively permanent. The producer observes 
the shock rjt-i at t — 1, before making the production 
decision. The shock et is observed at t, after the produc-
tion decision has been made. Basically, the production 
decisions respond to changes in the permanent demand 
component, but the decisions are made before the 
temporary movements in demand are known. 
When this industry has no futures trading, the produc-
er's profits are given by 
(1) 7rt = ptqt-ct 
where pt denotes the price at time t. The producer's 
profits depend on both the price and the chosen quanti-
ty. Although able to control the quantity of the good 
produced, the producer is at the mercy of market forces, 
which determine the price of the good. Because of the 
shocks affecting demand, the price of the good varies, 
depending on the realization of the temporary shock e. 
Consequently, profits vary, depending on the realiza-
tion of this shock. So, how much the producer chooses 
to produce depends on his or her attitude toward risk. If 
extremely risk averse, for example, the producer might 
decide not to produce anything at all. 
The traditional way to model decisions under uncer-
tainty is to assume that the producer seeks to maximize 
the expected, or average, utility of profits. Typically, 
this formulation implies that the producer is willing to 
pay a premium to insure against risk. Formally, we 
13 assume that the producer maximizes the expected utili-
ty of profits Eu(tt), where u is a strictly concave func-
tion. 
When futures trading is introduced into the envi-
ronment, the producer, in addition to deciding how 
much to produce, must also make one more decision: 
the number of futures contracts to buy at t — 1 for 
delivery of goods at t. Let mt-X denote the number of 
futures contracts sold at t — 1 for delivery of the good at 
t. Let ft-i denote the price of each contract, which is a 
promise to deliver one unit of the good. 
In the economy with futures trading, we use a super-
script / to distinguish variables from their correspon-
dents in the economy without futures trading. When 
futures trading is permitted, the producer's profits 7r{at 
time t are 
(2) trft = p{qft + mt-x(ft-x -pft)- C(qft). 
Equation (2) says that the producer must deliver mt-X 
units of the good and does so by purchasing this good 
at the market (or spot) price pft. In return, the producer 
receives ft-\ per unit delivered under the contract. 
From (2) it follows that a producer who sells contracts 
exactly equal to planned production can thereby elimi-
nate all the risk in profits and guarantee profits equal to 
ft-xqf-aqft). 
As mentioned earlier, we assume that speculators 
are risk neutral. They buy and sell futures contracts to 
maximize expected profits, and they do not care about 
the risk in the variability of their profits. Consequently, 
when futures trading is permitted, speculators want to 
sell an infinite number of futures contracts if the 
average spot price they expect is higher than the futures 
price; if the expected spot price is lower than the futures 
price, then they want to buy an infinite number of 
contracts. Thus, the expected spot price must equal the 
futures price: 
(3) ft-1 = Et-i(p{)' 
If this is true, then producers, by purchasing contracts 
equal to planned production, can guarantee their aver-
age profits. Since producers are risk averse, they will 
insure themselves completely, accept their guaranteed 
average profit levels, and let the speculators bear all the 
risk. 
A Setup for Price Stability 
Within the general model environment just presented, 
we now obtain a set of sufficient conditions for the 
introduction of futures trading to stabilize spot prices. 
We use a standard measure of how much prices move: 
the unconditional variance of spot prices. This measures 
the deviation of prices about their mean (or average) 
level over long periods and weights these deviations by 
both their magnitudes and their frequencies of occur-
rence. To analyze the effect of the introduction of 
futures markets on the variability of prices, we use a 
very intuitive graphical approach. We show that if the 
marginal (or incremental) costs of production are con-
stant and if demand disturbances cause parallel shifts in 
the demand curve, then futures markets stabilize spot 
prices. 
Let's suppose the cost function is given by C(q) = cq, 
where c is some positive constant. Here, the per-unit 
production costs do not depend on the amount or scale 
of production. Also suppose that the inverse demand 
function is given by 
(4) P(Ql,el,vl-l) = G(Q,) + tt + rh-i 
where Et-{(et) = 0 and G(-) is a decreasing function. 
Denote the conditional variance of e by a} and the 
variance of 77 by 0%. Note that the disturbances to 
demand, et and 77,, are additive. For now, assume that 
the industry has a fixed number n of competitive 
producers, each of whom produces the same quantity of 
a good in equilibrium. Denote the expected, or average, 
price by pt. It follows that, in equilibrium, 
(5) Pt = Pt+tt= G(nqt) + e, + 77,M. 
Our approach to the problem of determining the 
equilibrium price in this model is simple. First, we 
express the quantity produced as a function of the 
average price pt to get an aggregate supply curve. Then, 
by combining the supply curve with the demand curve 
in (5), we can determine the market-clearing price. The 
supply curve is determined from the first-order condi-
tion to the producer's maximization problem without 
futures trading, given by 
(6) Et-x\u\irt)(pt — c)] = 0 
where the prime indicates the derivative of the utility 
function. From equation (5), a necessary condition for 
an equilibrium is that 
(7) Et-X{u'[(Pt + e, - c)qt](pt + et - c)} = 0. 
Equation (7) defines a unique solution for qt as a func-
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Figures 1 and 2 
How Futures Markets Affect Price Volatility in the Original Setup*... 
Figure 1 Average Supply and Demand Figure 2 Average Supply and Demand 
Without Futures Markets With Futures Markets 
*This setup assumes additive demand shocks, constant marginal costs, and a fixed number of producers. 
tion of pt. Given the number of producers, the aggregate 
quantity produced is a function of the average price. 
This solution can be thought of as a supply curve. The 
intersection of this supply curve with the part of the 
demand curve given by G(0 + 77 yields the average 
price the producers expect to prevail. 
Figure 1 shows how prices are determined for a 
given value of the persistent shock 77. The intersection 
of the average supply and demand curves gives us the 
quantity produced Q. Demand curves are also drawn 
for a positive and a negative value of the temporary 
shock e. When this shock is positive, the price is higher 
than average; when negative, the price is lower than 
average. So in each period, the variance of prices, given 
the quantity produced, is identical to the variance of the 
shock t. Formally, we say that the conditional variance 
of the spot price equals the variance of e. 
However, prices also vary over time because of the 
persistent shock 77 which, in turn, makes producers' de-
cisions vary over time. These effects cause the average 
spot price to vary over time as well. The nature of these 
variations can also be understood from Figure 1. An 
increase in the persistent shock 77 causes the average 
demand curve to make a parallel shift upward, thereby 
changing the quantity produced and the average price. 
Price Volatility Decreases... 
Now let's see what happens to price variability when 
futures markets are permitted to operate under this 
setup. 
We have already argued that the futures price equals 
the average spot price in each period and that producers 
transfer all the risk to speculators. Suppose the futures 
price were to exceed the marginal cost of production 
(assumed to be constant). Then, since unit costs are 
constant, increasing production would increase profits 
indefinitely. But if the futures price were less than the 
cost of production, then producers would be better off 
not producing anything. It follows that the futures price, 
and thus the average spot price, always exactly equals 
15 the marginal cost of production. 
This situation is shown in Figure 2. Here, the only 
source of variability in prices is the temporary shock e. 
But the variability in prices due to e is the same with and 
without futures markets because this shock affects 
demand additively. Without futures markets, the move-
ments of output in response to the relatively permanent 
shock 77 are a source of price fluctuations. With futures 
markets, however, this source of variability is absent. 
Clearly, then, the variability in prices is lower with 
futures trading than without it. 
... But So Does Producer Welfare 
Does the lower volatility of prices imply that producers 
and consumers are better off with futures markets than 
without them? No. Futures markets make producers 
worse off and consumers better off. 
To see that producers are made worse off, notice that 
when we allow futures trading, prices are always equal 
to the marginal costs of production. Therefore, produc-
ers make zero profits. In effect, producers are indiffer-
ent between producing and not producing at all. With-
out futures markets, however, producers are indifferent 
between producing and not producing one more unit at 
the margin. Consequently, producers are made worse 
off by the introduction of futures markets. 
We can express this outcome formally. For any 
strictly concave function, it is well known that if profits 
ttt^O, then 
(8) M(7r) - w(0) > M'(7T)7T. 
By taking expectations on both sides and using (6), we 
can see that the right side of (8) is zero. Therefore, the 
left side is strictly positive. 
Whereas producers are made worse off by the intro-
duction of futures trading, consumers are made better 
off. This result follows from a fundamental result in 
welfare economics: complete, competitive markets 
yield Pareto-optimal allocations. That is, no one can be 
made better off without making someone else worse 
off. In the model with futures trading, markets are 
complete. Therefore, if shutting down futures markets 
makes producers better off, it must make someone else 
worse off—in this case, consumers. That means con-
sumers are better off with futures markets than without 
them. 
One caveat is required here. If a government can levy 
lump-sum taxes on consumers and make lump-sum 
transfers to producers, then a tax system could be de-
vised to make everyone better off when futures markets 
are introduced. That such taxes and transfers are gener-
ally quite difficult to administer is well recognized. 
A Change in Setup 
Our results so far may well depend on the special 
assumptions we made about marginal cost being con-
stant, demand being linear, and demand shocks being 
additive. The assumption of a constant marginal cost of 
production is particularly suspect in many applications. 
For instance, the scarcity of some resources, like high-
quality land, tends to imply that the incremental costs of 
production increase with the quantity produced. We 
therefore change our earlier setup to cost functions with 
increasing, rather than constant, marginal cost. 
To get sharp results about the effect of futures 
markets on price volatility, we need to impose restric-
tive assumptions on the demand curve and on the risk 
aversion of producers. Specifically, we impose three 
assumptions: 
• The inverse demand function is given by 
Vt-i ~ dqt + et. 
• The cost function is given by aqt + bq}. 
• The producer's utility function shows constant 
absolute aversion to risk. 
The first assumption simply says that the demand curve 
is linear in output. The second implies that the marginal 
cost of production is also linear in output. The third, a 
special but widely used form of representing attitudes 
toward risk, says that the premium someone is willing 
to pay to eliminate a given risk is independent of the 
person's wealth. We adopt this third assumption be-
cause much of the literature uses it to model the risk 
preferences of producers (Kawai 1983,Turnovsky 1983). 
Price Volatility Decreases Again ... 
To analyze the effect of futures markets on the volatility 
of prices, we again use a simple graph of supply and 
demand. (See Figure 3.) And our results are similar to 
those in the earlier setup. 
Let pt denote the conditional expectation at time t of 
the spot price at t— 1. With linear shocks to demand, the 
spot price is given by pt + et. A typical producer's profits 
are given by (pt + et)qt — a — bq}. The first-order 
condition to the producer's maximization problem with-
out futures trading is given by 
(9) Et-\[u'(jrt)(pt + et— 2bqt)] = 0. 
This first-order condition gives the supply function of 
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Figure 3 
... In the Basic Changed Setup*... 
Average Supply and Demand 
*The basic changes are to linear, increasing marginal costs 
and to constant absolute risk aversion tor producers. 
each producer as a function of the average price 
expected in the next period. When futures trading is 
permitted, the producer equates the futures price with 
the marginal cost of production. Therefore, the supply 
function of the producer is 
(10) pft = a + 2bqft. 
The supply curves, with and without futures trading, are 
shown in Figure 3. The supply curve without futures 
trading is the steeper one, both at every level of output 
and for every realization of the persistent shock r)t-{. 
By totally differentiating equation (9) and collecting 
terms, we get 
(11) E[u"(7R)(p + e-a~2bq)p] + Eu'(tt) 
+ E[ u"(tt)(p + e~a~2bq)
2] (,dq/dp) 
- 2bu'(ir)(dqldp) = 0 
where u" denotes the second derivative of the utility 
function. (Hereon, where possible, we drop the time 
subscript for convenience.) A key property of constant 
absolute risk aversion preferences is that u" is propor-
tional to u'. Therefore, from (9) it follows that the first 
term in (11) is zero. The remaining terms can be 
rearranged to get the slope of the supply curve without 
futures trading: 
(12) dqtldpt = (2b ~ {Et-X[u\7r^pt+t-a-2bqtn 
-r Et-X[u\7rt)}}T\ 
From equation (10), we have 
(13) dqft/dpft= I/2b. 
Since u"(Trt) is negative, the right side of equation 
(12) is less than the right side of (13). The slope of the 
supply curve is the inverse of the derivative of the 
quantity with respect to the price. Therefore, the supply 
curve without futures markets is steeper than the supply 
curve with futures markets. 
Now consider any two distinct realizations of the 
persistent shock r]t-X and the corresponding expected 
values of the two inverse demand functions, based on 
information available at t — 1. Let the supply curve 
without futures markets intersect the two demand 
functions at M and N. Let R and S be the points where 
the supply curve with futures trading intersects the 
demand functions. 
To see what happens to the volatility of prices with 
futures markets, we observe that the vertical distance D 
between the points M and N is greater than the vertical 
distance Df between the points R and S. This is readily 
seen to be true, since the slope of the supply curve with 
futures trading is a constant that is less than the slope of 
the supply curve without futures trading for every level 
of output, and the inverse demand curves are linear and 
downward sloping. 
This geometry implies that as the persistent shock 77 
varies, the spot price varies less with futures markets 
than without them. Here, as under the constant margi-
nal cost setup, the variability of prices due to the 
temporary shock e is the same with and without futures 
markets. Therefore, what remains is the variability 
caused by 77, and we have shown that this variability 
decreases when futures markets are introduced. 
Formally, our procedure involves the use of a 
standard decomposition theorem, which says that the 
unconditional variance of spot prices can be decom-
posed into the variance of the conditional mean and the 
mean of the conditional variance: 
(14) var(/?,) = var^-^+e,)] +£[var,_1(p,+ €,)]. 
The second term in equation (14) is the same with and 
17 without futures markets. Therefore, to show that the 
variance of the spot price decreases with the introduc-
tion of futures trading, we only need to show that the 
magnitude of the difference between the expected spot 
prices for any two different realizations of r)t-X de-
creases when futures trading is allowed. 
The geometric argument also implies that the long-
run average price without futures trading exceeds the 
long-run average price with futures trading. The supply 
is zero when the expected price in the next period equals 
a, the marginal cost at zero output. Hence, the two 
supply curves start from the same point on the vertical 
axis of Figure 3, and the steeper supply curve always 
stays above the flatter one. 
... But What Happens to Welfare? 
These changes in assumptions do not change the price 
volatility result, but they do change the welfare result. 
With these changes, the welfare effect of introducing 
futures markets becomes ambiguous. 
One reason for this ambiguity is suggested by 
another look at Figure 3. For simplicity, suppose the 
industry has only one producer, so that this producer's 
output equals aggregate output. Then the area of the 
triangle aRpf measures the producer's surplus or profit. 
This is because the producer's revenue is the product of 
price and quantity, given by the rectangle OpfRQf, and 
the area under the marginal cost curve is the total 
production cost. The corresponding average surplus 
without futures markets is measured by the triangle 
aMp. If the marginal cost curve is sufficiently flat or the 
demand curve sufficiently steep, then the average 
surplus without futures markets will be large relative to 
the surplus without them. Of course, in the environment 
without futures markets, the producer also bears some 
price risk. But Figure 3 suggests that the introduction of 
futures markets could very likely make producers 
worse off. 
We formally demonstrate this possibility by consider-
ing the special case where the temporary shocks e are 
drawn from a normal distribution with zero mean and 
variance o}. Some tedious but straightforward algebra 
will show that a necessary and sufficient condition for 
increasing the producer's welfare as a result of the 
introduction of futures markets is 
(15) bao}>d2 + 2bd 
where a is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. If 
the slope of the marginal cost curve is relatively small 
and the slope of the inverse demand curve relatively 
large, then the producer can be made strictly worse off. 
In particular, as we have already shown, the producer is 
made worse off by the opening of futures markets when 
b = 0—that is, when the marginal cost of production is 
constant. 
What about consumer welfare? In the case in which 
producers are made worse off by the introduction of 
futures markets, we can use the same arguments used 
earlier in the constant marginal cost setup to show that 
consumers are made better off. But if producers are 
made better off, then the effect on consumers' welfare is 
ambiguous. 
Allowing Free Entry 
So far, we have shown that under some assumptions, 
futures markets stabilize prices, but that even when they 
do, their effect on welfare is ambiguous. We now ask, 
Does the stability result hold for a large class of models? 
Until now, we have assumed that the number of 
producers in our model industry is fixed. This assump-
tion is questionable. Moreover, the effects of futures 
markets on welfare as well as on price volatility clearly 
depend on it. For example, if some producers are made 
worse off by the introduction of futures markets, some 
of them might leave to pursue other activities, thereby 
attenuating the loss of welfare of other producers. This 
exit decision might also change how prices move. To 
consider these effects, we assume that there is a large 
number of risk-averse potential producers and that 
there is another input in production (say, land) that is in 
fixed supply. Aggregate output can be increased only by 
using land of lower productivity. 
Suppose, then, that each producer can produce either 
one unit of the good or none. The cost of producing one 
unit is Ci for producer i for i = 1,2,3, Assume that 
q > Cj for i > j. Each producer acts as a price taker and 
chooses to produce one unit if 
(16) E{u(p-q)}>u( 0) 
where the producer's utility function for profits exhibits 
constant absolute risk aversion. Here w(0) is interpreted 
as the utility available from other activities. The 
average demand curve, which gives the expected price 
as a function of the quantity consumed, is shown in 
Figure 4. 
Now What Happens to Prices? 
Recall that since producers face no risk with futures 
markets, the supply curve with futures trading is just the 
marginal cost curve. To consider the case without 
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futures trading, we need some additional notation. Let 
Pi denote the expected price that would make producer i 
exactly indifferent to producing or not. Hence, pt is 
implicitly defined by 
(17) E[u(pi + e~ci)] = u( 0). 
It follows that ^ — c, = pj — Cj for all i and j. 
Define <5 as pt — q. The term 8 is the risk premium 
required to compensate producers when futures mar-
kets are absent. Hence, the supply curve with futures 
trading is the same as that without futures trading but 
shifted down by the amount of the risk premium <5, as 
shown in Figure 4. It follows that futures trading 
reduces the spot price on average. However, the effect 
on the variance of prices clearly depends on the shape of 
the supply curve. The variance could increase or 
decrease or, if marginal cost is linear, be unaffected. 
Producer Welfare Increases 
It can be seen that the number of producers with futures 
trading, n, is more than the number of producers with-
out futures trading, N. The nth producer is clearly indif-
ferent between producing and not producing and hence 
remains unaffected by the introduction of futures 
trading. In contrast, the Mh producer, who was indiffer-
ent to producing or not producing without futures 
Figure 4 
... And in a Model With Free Entry* 
Average Supply and Demand 
*Here demand shocks are additive and the number of producers 
is changeable. 
trading, is clearly better off when futures trading is 
introduced. 
What about the other producers? Each producer is 
willing to give up 8 units to get rid of the uncertainty 
associated with the price. But the average price declines 
by less than 8, since the demand curve slopes downward 
and the supply curve slopes upward. Therefore, produc-
ers are made better off. (The effect on consumers' wel-
fare is ambiguous.) 
The assumption that producers' preferences are 
identical and exhibit constant absolute risk aversion is 
crucial to the result that producers are made better off. 
For example, suppose absolute risk aversion decreases 
with wealth; that is, suppose poorer people are willing 
to pay a larger premium than richer ones to be insured 
against the same risk. Then the producer with the 
smallest cost of production (the one who earns the 
greatest profit) will be less averse to price uncertainty 
than the producer with a higher production cost. Even 
though the marginal producer is made better off, some 
low-cost producers may be made worse off if the supply 
curve is sufficiently steep. 
Relaxing Some Assumptions 
We have shown that futures markets stabilize prices 
under three restrictive assumptions—when the produc-
er's utility function displays constant absolute risk 
aversion, the marginal cost is linear, and shocks to 
demand are additive. We now show three examples of 
what happens when any one of these assumptions is 
relaxed: futures trading may increase the variance of 
spot prices. In each of the examples, the variability of 
the price due to the transitory shock e is the same with 
and without futures markets. However, the variability 
of the price due to the persistent shock rj is larger with 
futures markets than without them. (For a summary of 
all our results, see the accompanying table.) 
Example 1. About Risk Aversion 
First, let's relax the assumption of constant absolute risk 
aversion by the producer. Assume instead that u(tt) = 
ln(7r), C(q) = q
2, and et= 1 or — 1 with equal probability. 
Assume also that the inverse demand curve is linear and 
downward sloping. We show that under these assump-
tions the supply curve, as a function of the expected 
price pt, is steeper with futures trading than without it. 
This means the magnitude of the difference between 
the expected spot prices that will result for any two 
different realizations of rjt-i increases when futures 
trading is allowed. Therefore, the variability of the spot 
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INFORMATION MODEL  ?  t t 
price increases due to the introduction of futures 
markets. 
Substituting for w'('X 7t„ et, a = 1, and b — 1 in the 
first-order condition to the maximization problem 
given in (9) and simplifying, we get 
(18) p?-3ptqt + 2q}~l=0. 
Solving equation (18) for q gives 
(19) qt = [3pt — {p} + 8)
1/2]/4. 
We take the negative square root since the second-
order conditions for a maximum are satisfied there. 
Totally differentiating (19) gives 
(20) dptldqt = (3pt - Aqt)/(2pt - 3qt). 
We can now compare this slope with the slope of the 
supply curve with futures trading. The slope with 
futures trading is simply the marginal cost of produc-
tion, which is 2. Equation (20) easily implies that 
(21) dpt/dqt< 2. 
Thus, the supply curve is steeper with futures trading 
than without it. 
Example 2. About Marginal Cost 
Now let's see what happens when we relax the assump-
tion that the marginal cost of production is linear. In-
stead, let the cost function C(-) be given by 
(22) C(q) = 




Let the expected utility function of the producer be 
given by 
(23) £,-I[M(TT,)] = £,_I(tt,) - var,_!(7r,). 
This utility function is consistent with constant absolute 
risk aversion if the disturbances are normally distrib-
uted. Let et be normal with zero mean, the variance 
o}= 1, and the inverse demand function be 
(24) pt = rjt-i - Aqt + e, 
where the persistent shock r)t-X is either 1 or 5 with 
equal probability. 
It can be verified that in this economy, shocks of 1 
and 5 lead to average prices of 0.80 and 4.00 without 
futures markets and 0.67 and 3.90 with them. The price 
variances without and with futures markets are 2.56 
and 2.60. Thus, although futures trading decreases the 
spot price's average, it increases the spot price's varia-
bility. Futures trading reduces the average price signifi-
cantly when demand is fairly low, but only slightly 
when demand is high. Physical constraints on produc-
tion become more important at higher levels of produc-
tion. 
Although this example is rather artificial, it does 
capture the flavor of industries like agriculture, which 
have production factors that are fixed in the short run. 
Example 3. About Demand Shocks 
Finally, let's relax the assumption that shocks to 
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demand are linear. Suppose the utility function of the 
producer is the same as (23) in Example 2. Let the 
inverse demand function be given by 
(25) pt = 5 - dqt + e, 
where d is either 0.1 or 10 with equal probability and e, 
is drawn from a standard normal distribution, again as 
in Example 2. Let the cost function of the producer be 
given by 
(26) C(qt) = ql 
It can be verified that the supply curves of this producer 
without and with futures markets are 
(27) Et-\(pt) = 4qt 
(28) Et-X(pft) = 2(/r 
Hence, Et-\(pt) will be either 4.88 or 1.43, depending 
on the realization of the shock to demand, while 
Et-{(pft) will be either 4.76 or 0.83. 
It is easy to see that the variance of the spot price 
increases with the introduction of futures trading. In this 
example, the supply curve becomes less steep with the 
introduction of futures trading. In addition, high de-
mand periods are also periods with a flat demand curve. 
These effects cause the variability of the conditional 
expected spot price to increase when futures trading is 
introduced. 
An Alternative Model 
Do our largely negative results stem exclusively from 
our focus on the insurance role of futures markets? We 
think not. To make this point precise, we develop a 
model in which futures markets instead play an in-
formational role; they aggregate and disseminate infor-
mation about demand for goods. We show that in this 
model, too, futures trading can increase the variability 
of spot prices even though all participants are made 
strictly better off. 
This model is closely related to one developed by 
Hart and Kreps (1986). In their model, inventory hold-
ers have superior information, but when inventory 
holding is prohibited, the variability of spot prices is 
reduced. 
In our version of that model, again, futures markets 
serve as a channel for communicating information. 
Speculators have better information about the state of 
future demand than do producers. If futures markets are 
prohibited, speculators cannot transmit this informa-
tion to producers. However, with futures markets, the 
futures price reveals it, and producers can better plan 
their production. As might be expected, both producers 
and consumers are made better off when producers get 
this information. Prices, however, might become more 
or less volatile. 
Formally, we consider a linear-quadratic model so 
that the effect on variances is easily computed. We also 
assume that both the producer and the speculator are 
risk neutral. 
At each time t, the producer decides on the quantity 
qt to be produced. Note that here we do not require 
production commitments to be made one period in 
advance. 
The cost incurred by the producer at t is given by 
(29) C(qt) = ct=d0qt + (l/2)8lq} 
+ (l/2)82(qt+yqt-l)
2. 
For technical reasons, we assume that 0 < y < 1. 
Equation (29) says that the marginal cost of production 
at time t increases with the quantity qt~\ at t — 1. 
Agriculture provides a simple example of this. If cereals 
are grown on the same land season after season, the 
productivity of the land falls. As a result, the farmer 
either has to leave the land idle for awhile or has to plant 
some other crop, such as legumes, that may be less 
profitable. 
In this model, when there is no futures trading, the 
producer chooses a sequence {qt}?=o so as to maximize 
the discounted value of profits 
(30) Eo{X=oP\m-c\} 
where E0(-) is the expectation operator conditioned on 
the information available to the producer at time 0 and 
P is a number between zero and one. The inverse de-
mand function is given by 
(31) pt=r]t- aqt 
where the future shock to demand, 77,+1, is known to the 
speculator at t, but observed by the producer only at 
t +1. We assume that the demand shocks rjt are 
identically and independently distributed over time. 
The key difference between this economy with and 
without futures markets is that with futures markets, the 
producer at time t knows, from the futures price, the 
value of the demand shock rjt+\. So, for example, if the 
21 current shock 77, is high and the future shock is low, then 
the producer can and will produce a large quantity 
today. Without futures markets, though, the producer 
may well be reluctant to produce a lot today because 
this decision would raise marginal costs of production 
tomorrow and so restrict the ability to produce a lot 
tomorrow. 
This argument also suggests two effects that work at 
cross-purposes in determining what happens to the 
volatility of prices. With futures markets, the current 
output decision depends on both today's and tomor-
row's demand shocks. Without futures markets, the 
output decision depends only on today's shock. There-
fore, for any given value of today's shock, output and so 
today's price are more variable with futures markets. 
However, futures markets also make tomorrow's output 
more responsive to the demand disturbance; hence, they 
reduce the volatility of tomorrow's spot price. 
Given these two effects, the introduction of futures 
markets may make price volatility increase or decrease, 
depending on the value of the parameters. In the Appen-
dix, we establish sufficient conditions for an increase. 
In this model, the effect of futures markets on wel-
fare is unambiguous: Everyone is made better off. 
Summary and Policy Implications 
Here we have examined what happens to spot prices of 
nonstorable goods when trading in futures contracts is 
introduced into an economy. We have shown that there 
is no theoretical presumption that futures markets stabi-
lize prices. We have also shown that lower volatility of 
prices is not necessarily associated with higher econom-
ic welfare. 
We have used a simple, graphical approach to study 
the price effect. Futures trading turns out to stabilize 
prices when the supply curve becomes flatter, but not 
when the supply curve becomes steeper; then prices 
become more volatile. This graphical approach made it 
fairly straightforward to construct examples of both 
increases and decreases in price volatility resulting 
from the introduction of futures markets. 
The previous academic literature finds that if fluctu-
ations in prices primarily stem from disturbances in 
demand for goods, then the introduction of futures 
markets will stabilize spot prices. If, instead, inventory 
disturbances or production uncertainty are the prepon-
derant shocks, then futures markets tend to destabilize 
prices. The literature assumes that producers, consum-
ers, and speculators all have utility functions with 
constant absolute risk aversion, that marginal costs are 
linear, and that shocks are normally distributed. (See 
Kawai 1983 and Turnovsky 1983.) 
Our assumptions are not the same as those in the 
literature. We have shown that even without inventory-
holding decisions or production uncertainty, changing 
the assumptions can lead to increased volatility of 
prices with futures markets. Our results are more 
general along some dimensions since we do not make 
any assumptions regarding the nature of the probability 
distribution of prices. We do, however, assume that 
speculators are risk neutral. This assumption simplifies 
the analysis and lets us use more intuitive, geometric 
methods in proving the results. Since a primary function 
of futures markets is to provide an outlet for producers 
to purchase insurance, it seems natural to assume that 
speculators are less risk averse than producers. That 
speculators are risk neutral is just the extreme version of 
this assumption. 
The fundamental policymaking issue here concerns 
the welfare implications of trading in futures markets. 
We have shown that the connection between spot price 
volatility and welfare is tenuous. Even when futures 
trading leads to a reduction in price volatility, some 
market participants can be made worse off. We need 
rather strong restrictions on the preferences of produc-
ers to ensure that everyone is made better off by the 
introduction of futures trading. Therefore, in judging 
whether or not policy changes are desirable, policy-
makers cannot simply argue that prices will become 
less volatile. Rather, for any proposed reforms, policy-
makers must weigh the benefits produced for those who 
will gain against the costs incurred by those who will 
lose. 
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Appendix 
When Futures Markets Increase Price Volatility 
in the Information Model 
Here we establish sufficient conditions for the introduction of 
futures markets to increase the variance of prices when fu-
tures markets are playing an informational role in an econo-
my. 
We start with the Euler equations for the producer's 
problem in equation (30) of the preceding paper: 
(Al) P{pt -<50- 8xqt - 82(qt+yqt_l)} 
— P
t+ly82Et-i (qt+l + yqt) = 0 
for t = 1,2,..., with q0 given and the transversality condition 
given by 
(A2) \imT^p
T{pT-80 - 8xqT- 82(qT+yqT^)} = 0. 
Note that pt and qt are in the information set of the producer at 
time t— 1. Standard techniques (as in Sargent 1979) can be 
used to show that the solution to the Euler equations that 
satisfies the transversality condition is 
(A3) qt+l = \lqt-(\/\2Pyd2) 
where kxk2 — 1 //?, 
(A4) -(A, + k2) = (a + 6, + 82 + 82y
2p)//3y82 
and A, and k2 are the roots of the characteristic equation. Let 
k2<k{. Then k2 >-(a + 5, + <52 + 82y
2P)//3y82. Solving 
(A3) and using the assumption that the demand shocks are 
identically and independently distributed, we have 
(A5) qt+l = -(\/k2Py82){Xj=oK(Vt^-r^)} + Kx 
where Kx is a constant. Using the demand function, we get the 
price without futures markets: 
(A6) pt+x = 77,+1 + (a/X2^752){S>=0M(^+i-;-5o)} 
+ K2 
where K2 is a constant. Hence, 





 [1/(1—Xf)] var(77). 
In the economy with futures markets, both the producer 
and the speculator are risk neutral. Therefore, the only 
equilibrium is one in which the producer infers r]t+l (which is 
already known to the speculator at t) by observing the futures 
price. The equilibrium quantity of futures contracts is inde-
terminate. 
Let denote the spot price at t with futures trading, as 
before. It can then be shown that 
(A8) p[+l = rjt+l + (a/klPy82)(rjt+2-80) 
+ [a(l+X)/X2i8752]S7=oM(^i-7-5o) 
where k = k{/k2. The variance of the spot price with futures 
markets is then given by 













Since k > 0, the last term in (A9) is strictly greater than the last 
term in (A7). 
A sufficient condition for var(pf) to be greater than var(p) 
is 








> 1 + (2a/k2Py82) + k
2/(A2)67<52)
2]. 
Simplifying (A 10), we get the sufficient condition 
(All) 2k(k2py82 + a) + (ot/kl) + <*\
2>0. 
Since A
2>0,X2 = 1 //?, and k2py82>—(a+8i +82+/3y
282), 
(All) holds if 
(A 12) a>2(8l+82+/3y
282)//3. 
Clearly, condition (A 12) is satisfied if the slope of the demand 
curve a is sufficiently large. The expression in parentheses on 
the right side of (A 12) is the slope of the supply curve when 
7=1. When that is true, (A 12) is satisfied if the slope of the 
supply curve is sufficiently small. 
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